Politicians’ Equity Holdings and Accounting Conservatism

66 Pages Posted: 3 Jan 2014 Last revised: 30 May 2015

Date Written: May 2015


I examine the association between politician ownership and accounting conservatism for a sample of S&P 1500 firms between 2005 and 2011. The contracting explanation predicts that politician owned firms adopt less conservative accounting because lenders are less concerned with downside default risk for these politically favored firms. The political costs explanation predicts that politician owned firms adopt more conservative financial reporting to shield allied politicians from voter scrutiny. I find that equity ownership by members of the U.S. House and Senate is associated with lower levels of conditional conservatism. This negative association is more pronounced among: (1) firms owned by local politicians, where there is a greater alignment between the interests of the politician and the firm, and (2) firms with long-term issuer credit ratings, for which debt market participants particularly value conservatism as a mechanism for conveying information on downside default risk. I also examine the relationship between politician ownership and unconditional conservatism and fail to document a statistical relationship between the two measures. Collectively, the results provide consistent evidence of a lower contracting demand for conditional conservatism among politician owned firms.

Keywords: politician ownership, accounting conservatism, capital markets

JEL Classification: G10, G11, G18, G38

Suggested Citation

Baloria, Vishal P., Politicians’ Equity Holdings and Accounting Conservatism (May 2015). 2014 Canadian Academic Accounting Association (CAAA) Annual Conference, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2374036 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374036

Vishal P. Baloria (Contact Author)

Boston College ( email )

140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States

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