The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence

Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 13-36-REV2

43 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2014 Last revised: 19 Aug 2015

See all articles by Lucija Muehlenbachs

Lucija Muehlenbachs

Resources for the Future; University of Calgary

Stefan Staubli

University of Zurich; RAND Corporation - Labor and Population; Netspar

Mark A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics; Vanderbilt University - Law School; Resources for the Future

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 14, 2015

Abstract

This paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams. Government enforcement agencies often send teams of inspectors instead of a sole inspector to a regulated facility. Yet, determining the impact of teams is problematic due to endogeneity (e.g., the enforcement agency might naturally send larger teams when they expect a more violations). Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we show that adding an inspector to a team increases the number of sanctions issued as well as the severity of the sanctions.

Keywords: inspections, enforcement, deterrence offshore oil

JEL Classification: Q58, K42

Suggested Citation

Muehlenbachs, Lucija and Staubli, Stefan and Cohen, Mark A., The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence (August 14, 2015). Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 13-36-REV2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2374460 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2374460

Lucija Muehlenbachs (Contact Author)

Resources for the Future ( email )

Washington, DC 20036
United States

University of Calgary ( email )

University Drive
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada

Stefan Staubli

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

RAND Corporation - Labor and Population ( email )

United States

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Mark A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )

Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-0533 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://business.vanderbilt.edu/bio/mark-cohen/

Vanderbilt University - Law School

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

Resources for the Future ( email )

1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-328-5000 (Phone)

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