The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence
Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 13-36-REV2
43 Pages Posted: 4 Jan 2014 Last revised: 19 Aug 2015
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence
The Effect of Inspector Group Size and Familiarity on Enforcement and Deterrence
Date Written: August 14, 2015
Abstract
This paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams. Government enforcement agencies often send teams of inspectors instead of a sole inspector to a regulated facility. Yet, determining the impact of teams is problematic due to endogeneity (e.g., the enforcement agency might naturally send larger teams when they expect a more violations). Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we show that adding an inspector to a team increases the number of sanctions issued as well as the severity of the sanctions.
Keywords: inspections, enforcement, deterrence offshore oil
JEL Classification: Q58, K42
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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