Can Green Lobbies Replace a World Environmental Organisation?

21 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2000

See all articles by Paola Conconi

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Date Written: July 2000

Abstract

We employ a common agency model to examine how green lobbies affect the determination of trade and environmental policy in two large countries that are linked through trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, when governments are not restricted in their ability to use trade barriers, environmental lobbying always results in higher pollution taxes relative to a no-lobbying scenario. Consequently, uncoordinated environmental policies are closer to the efficient Pigouvian solution than internationally coordinated policies. If, however, governments are bound by international trade rules, green lobbies may bias environmental policies downwards and environmental policy coordination is unambiguously efficiency-enhancing.

Keywords: Environmental Protection, International Trade, Political Contributions

JEL Classification: D72, F13, Q20, Q28

Suggested Citation

Conconi, Paola, Can Green Lobbies Replace a World Environmental Organisation? (July 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=237450 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237450

Paola Conconi (Contact Author)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 2 650 2345 (Phone)
32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

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