Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-In in Multilateral Negotiations

30 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2000

See all articles by Carlo Perroni

Carlo Perroni

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Date Written: October 2001

Abstract

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction - for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.

Keywords: International Cooperation, Trade And Environmental Policy Negotiations

JEL Classification: F0, F1, Q3, C7

Suggested Citation

Perroni, Carlo and Conconi, Paola, Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-In in Multilateral Negotiations (October 2001). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 601; FEEM Working Paper No. 57.2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=237452 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237452

Carlo Perroni (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
44 24 7652 8416 (Phone)
44 24 7652 3032 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 2 650 2345 (Phone)
32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

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