Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games: An Experimental Study

Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper

25 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2000

See all articles by Esther Hauk

Esther Hauk

Instituto de Análisis Económic (IAE) Barcelona

Rosemarie Nagel

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 2000

Abstract

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intending defectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

JEL Classification: C72, D91

Suggested Citation

Hauk, Esther and Nagel, Rosemarie, Choice of Partners in Multiple Two-Person Prisoner's Dilemma Games: An Experimental Study (July 2000). Universitat Pompeu Fabra Working Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=237622 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237622

Esther Hauk (Contact Author)

Instituto de Análisis Económic (IAE) Barcelona ( email )

Barcelona, Bellaterra 08193
Spain

Rosemarie Nagel

Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
08005 Barcelona
Spain
+34 93 542 3729 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1746 (Fax)

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