Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271
 


 



The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study


Marco Becht


Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (ULB); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Julian R. Franks


London Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jeremy Grant


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Hannes F. Wagner


Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

March 2, 2015

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 402/2014

Abstract:     
This paper provides evidence that returns to hedge fund activism are driven by engagement outcomes. We use a sample of 1,740 activist engagements from 23 countries to estimate performance of activism across North America, Europe and Asia. Striking differences emerge across countries in outcomes of the engagements. It is these differences that explain the variation in performance of activism. Although there is evidence that activists put companies into play, frequently those takeovers are preceded by significant and profitable governance changes. While the U.S. model of activism has been copied by foreign activists, non-U.S. activists outperform U.S. activists in their domestic markets.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 73

Keywords: Shareholder activism, hedge funds, active ownership, institutional investors

JEL Classification: G32


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Date posted: January 11, 2014 ; Last revised: December 23, 2016

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco and Franks, Julian R. and Grant, Jeremy and Wagner, Hannes F., The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (March 2, 2015). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 402/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376271

Contact Information

Marco Becht
Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (ULB) ( email )
42 Avenue F. D. Roosevelt
1050
Brussels, 1050
Belgium
+32 2 6504466 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.solvay.edu/profile/marcobecht
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
Palace of the Academies
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogstraat
Brussels, 1000
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=6
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
London
United Kingdom
Julian R. Franks (Contact Author)
London Business School ( email )
Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Jeremy Grant
affiliation not provided to SSRN
Hannes F. Wagner
Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.unibocconi.eu/hanneswagner
Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )
Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy
Feedback to SSRN


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