Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study

59 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2014 Last revised: 22 May 2017

See all articles by Marco Becht

Marco Becht

Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (ULB); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Julian R. Franks

London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Jeremy Grant

London School of Economics

Hannes F. Wagner

Bocconi University - Department of Finance; Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2017

Abstract

This paper provides evidence on the incidence, characteristics, and performance of activist engagements across countries. We find that the incidence of activism is greatest with high institutional ownership, particularly for U.S. institutions. We use a sample of 1,740 activist engagements across 23 countries and find that almost one-quarter of engagements are by multi-activists engaging the same target. These engagements perform strikingly better than single activist engagements. Engagement outcomes, such as board changes and takeovers, vary across countries and significantly contribute to the returns to activism. Japan is an exception, with high initial expectations and low outcomes.

Keywords: Shareholder activism, hedge funds, active ownership, institutional investors

JEL Classification: G32

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco and Franks, Julian R. and Grant, Jeremy and Wagner, Hannes F., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (May 2017). Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Finance Working Paper No. 402/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376271 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376271

Marco Becht (Contact Author)

Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management (ULB) ( email )

42 Avenue F. D. Roosevelt
1050
Brussels, 1050
Belgium
+32 2 6504466 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.solvay.edu/profile/marcobecht

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

Palace of the Academies
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogstraat
Brussels, 1000
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.global/users/marco-becht

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Julian R. Franks

London Business School - Institute of Finance and Accounting ( email )

Institute of Finance and Accounting
Sussex Place - Regent's Park
London NW1 4SA
United Kingdom
+44 20 7262 5050 x3449 (Phone)
+44 20 7724 3317 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Jeremy Grant

London School of Economics ( email )

Houghton St
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Hannes F. Wagner

Bocconi University - Department of Finance ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milano, MI 20136
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.unibocconi.eu/hanneswagner

Bocconi University - IGIER - Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research ( email )

Via Roentgen 1
Milan, 20136
Italy

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