Disability Insurance and Healthcare Reform: Evidence from Massachusetts

20 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2014

See all articles by Nicole Maestas

Nicole Maestas

Harvard Medical School - Department of Health Care Policy

Kathleen J. Mullen

RAND Corporation

Alexander Strand

Social Security Administration

Date Written: November 1, 2013

Abstract

As health insurance becomes available outside of the employment relationship as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cost of applying for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) — potentially going without health insurance coverage during a waiting period totaling 29 months from disability onset — will decline for many people with employer-sponsored health insurance. At the same time, the value of SSDI and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation will decline for individuals who otherwise lacked access to health insurance. We study the 2006 Massachusetts healthcare reform to estimate the potential effects of the ACA on SSDI and SSI applications.

Keywords: Social Security Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, Affordable Care Act, health insurance, program interactions

Suggested Citation

Maestas, Nicole and Mullen, Kathleen J. and Strand, Alexander, Disability Insurance and Healthcare Reform: Evidence from Massachusetts (November 1, 2013). Michigan Retirement Research Center Research Paper No. 2013-289. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376453 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376453

Nicole Maestas (Contact Author)

Harvard Medical School - Department of Health Care Policy ( email )

180 Longwood Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
United States

Kathleen J. Mullen

RAND Corporation ( email )

1776 Main Street
P.O. Box 2138
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
United States
310-393-0411 x6265 (Phone)
310-260-8156 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://works.bepress.com/kathleen_mullen

Alexander Strand

Social Security Administration ( email )

Washington, DC
United States

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