Contracting and Reporting Conservatism around a Change in Fiduciary Duties
Contemporary Accounting Research, Forthcoming
48 Pages Posted: 9 Jan 2014 Last revised: 13 Jul 2020
Date Written: February 26, 2020
We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor-owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of creditors for Delaware-incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost effective in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms facing greater business uncertainty and firms with greater board independence.
Keywords: Contracting Conservatism; Reporting Conservatism; Debt Contracting; Fiduciary Duties; Corporate Governance
JEL Classification: G3, L2, M41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation