Persistence in Corporate Networks

Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers No. 184

35 Pages Posted: 10 Jan 2014

See all articles by Mishael Milakovic

Mishael Milakovic

University of Kiel

Matthias Raddant

Kiel Institute for the World Economy

Laura Birg

University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Date Written: January 9, 2014

Abstract

We examine the bipartite graphs of German corporate boards in 1993, 1999 and 2005, and identify cores of directors who are highly central in the entire network while being densely connected among themselves. The novel feature of this paper is the focus on the dynamics of these networks. Germany's corporate governance has experienced significant changes during this time, and there is substantial turnover in the identity of core members, yet we observe the persistent presence of a network core, which is even robust to changes in the tail distribution of multiple board memberships. Anecdotal evidence suggests that core persistence originates from the board appointment decisions of largely capitalized corporations.

Keywords: board networks, corporate governance, board recruitment

JEL Classification: G38, L14, M12

Suggested Citation

Milakovic, Mishael and Raddant, Matthias and Birg, Laura, Persistence in Corporate Networks (January 9, 2014). Center for European Governance and Economic Development Research Discussion Papers No. 184. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376734 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376734

Mishael Milakovic (Contact Author)

University of Kiel ( email )

Olshausenstr. 40
D-24118 Kiel, Schleswig-Holstein 24118
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.wiso.uni-kiel.de/gwif/team_milakovic.php

Matthias Raddant

Kiel Institute for the World Economy ( email )

P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, D-24100
Germany

Laura Birg

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Goettinger Sieben 3
Goettingen, D-37073
Germany
+49 551 39 19686 (Phone)

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