Emotional Strategies as Catalysts for Cooperation in Signed Networks

Forthcoming in Advances in Complex Systems

24 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2014 Last revised: 9 Jul 2016

See all articles by Simone Righi

Simone Righi

Department of Computer Science; University College London - Financial Computing and Analytics Group, Department of Computer Science

Károly Takács

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Centre for Social Sciences

Date Written: April 24, 2014

Abstract

The evolution of unconditional cooperation is one of the fundamental problems in science. A new solution is proposed to solve this puzzle. We treat this issue with an evolutionary model in which agents play the Prisoner's Dilemma on signed networks. The topology is allowed to co-evolve with relational signs as well as with agent strategies. We introduce a strategy that is conditional on the emotional content embedded in network signs. We show that this strategy acts as a catalyst and creates favorable conditions for the spread of unconditional cooperation. In line with the literature, we found evidence that the evolution of cooperation most likely occurs in networks with relatively high chances of rewiring and with low likelihood of strategy adoption. While a low likelihood of rewiring enhances cooperation, a very high likelihood seems to limit its diffusion. Furthermore, unlike in non-signed networks, cooperation becomes more prevalent in denser topologies.

Keywords: evolution of cooperation; signed graphs; network dynamics; negative ties; agent-based models

Suggested Citation

Righi, Simone and Takács, Károly, Emotional Strategies as Catalysts for Cooperation in Signed Networks (April 24, 2014). Forthcoming in Advances in Complex Systems. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376801 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376801

Simone Righi (Contact Author)

Department of Computer Science ( email )

66-72 Gower Street
London, London WC1E 6EA
Great Britain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/simone-righi/

University College London - Financial Computing and Analytics Group, Department of Computer Science ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Károly Takács

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Centre for Social Sciences ( email )

Országház u. 30
Budapest, H-1014
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://web.uni-corvinus.hu/~tkaroly

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