The Effect of Inspector Group Size and Familiarity on Enforcement and Deterrence

42 Pages Posted: 11 Jan 2014

See all articles by Lucija Muehlenbachs

Lucija Muehlenbachs

Resources for the Future; University of Calgary

Stefan Staubli

University of Zurich; RAND Corporation - Labor and Population; Netspar

Mark A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics; Vanderbilt University - Law School; Resources for the Future

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Abstract

The paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams and the relationship between the inspector and the inspected party. Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we find that adding an inspector does not simply result in more observed violations – it increases the severity of sanctions imposed on those violations that are detected. We also find that inspectors who are more familiar with the offender impose less severe sanctions. We only find weak evidence that increasing sanction severity deters incidents such as oil spills.

Keywords: inspections, enforcement, deterrence, offshore oil

JEL Classification: Q58, K42

Suggested Citation

Muehlenbachs, Lucija and Staubli, Stefan and Cohen, Mark A., The Effect of Inspector Group Size and Familiarity on Enforcement and Deterrence. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7876. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2377612

Lucija Muehlenbachs (Contact Author)

Resources for the Future ( email )

Washington, DC 20036
United States

University of Calgary ( email )

University Drive
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4
Canada

Stefan Staubli

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

RAND Corporation - Labor and Population ( email )

United States

Netspar ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Mark A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )

Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-0533 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://business.vanderbilt.edu/bio/mark-cohen/

Vanderbilt University - Law School

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

Resources for the Future ( email )

1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-328-5000 (Phone)

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