The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis

64 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2000

See all articles by Tatiana Nenova

Tatiana Nenova

World Bank, South Asia; World Bank - Policy Unit; Harvard University - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 21, 2000

Abstract

This paper measures corporate control benefits - the value that dominant vote-holders expropriate from a controlled company to the detriment of other shareholders. Control benefits are extracted from the total value of the votes in the control block, based on a baseline control contest model in the case of a dual-class firm. The study is based on a sample of 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries, using data for 1997. The determinants of control benefits are then explored in a consistent fashion across countries. We use measures of the general strictness of the legal environment, an index of takeover regulations, and a measure of power-concentrating Corporate Charter provisions, the probability of a control contest, and costs of holding the control block. We control for differences in the security value of the share classes, e.g. differences in dividend payments and liquidity. The value of control, or equivalently the total value of votes in the control block, ranges from about 0% in Denmark to 50% of firm market value in Mexico. Legal environment variables explain 75% of the cross-country variation in the value of control benefits.

JEL Classification: G30, G32, G34, G35, K22, N20

Suggested Citation

Nenova, Tatiana, The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis (July 21, 2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=237809 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.237809

Tatiana Nenova (Contact Author)

World Bank, South Asia ( email )

1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States

World Bank - Policy Unit ( email )

1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
(202) 458-9531 (Phone)
(202) 522-2031 (Fax)

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
3,044
rank
3,459
Abstract Views
17,219
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations while be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information