Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application

36 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2014

See all articles by Matthew Gould

Matthew Gould

University of Westminster

Matthew D. Rablen

University of Sheffield - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 30, 2013

Abstract

We develop a theoretical framework for equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a fully representative voting body delegates decision-making to a subset of the members, as describes, e.g., the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Three equity concepts are proposed: ex-ante (procedural) equity, ex-post (outcome) equity and regional equity. The last two concepts are consistent with a new square-root rule on the probability of council membership, but no CVG can meet all three concepts. We apply our framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it.

Keywords: United Nations Security Council, United Nations, voting power, councils, square-root rule, equity

JEL Classification: D720, D710, C710, C630

Suggested Citation

Gould, Matthew and Rablen, Matthew D., Equitable Representation in the Councils of the United Nations: Theory and Application (December 30, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4519. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2378210

Matthew Gould

University of Westminster ( email )

309 Regent Street
London, W1R 8AL
United Kingdom

Matthew D. Rablen (Contact Author)

University of Sheffield - Department of Economics ( email )

9 Mappin Street
Sheffield, S1 4DT
United Kingdom

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