Supply Chain Contracts Under Uncertainty of Retailer Counterfeiting

10 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2014 Last revised: 7 Aug 2014

See all articles by Naveen Sundaresan

Naveen Sundaresan

Indian Institute of Management (IIMB), Bangalore

Janat Shah

Indian Institute of Management Udaipur

Date Written: January 13, 2014

Abstract

We model a supply chain scenario in which the genuine manufacturer is uncertain whether a retailer sells counterfeits alongside authentic products. We evaluate the optimal strategies for players under wholesale price contracts and two-part tariff contracts and analyse the impact of the uncertainty of retailer counterfeiting on the manufacturer’s pricing and expected profits. Furthermore, we investigate whether the two-part tariff is more effective compared with the wholesale price contract.

Keywords: Counterfeiting, Information Asymmetry, Supply Chain Contracts

Suggested Citation

Sundaresan, Naveen and Shah, Janat, Supply Chain Contracts Under Uncertainty of Retailer Counterfeiting (January 13, 2014). Indian Institute of Management Udaipur Research Paper Series No. 2012-2171274, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2378226 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378226

Naveen Sundaresan (Contact Author)

Indian Institute of Management (IIMB), Bangalore ( email )

Bannerghatta Road
M 214
Bengaluru, 5600076
India

Janat Shah

Indian Institute of Management Udaipur ( email )

Mohanlal Sukhadia University Campus
Udaipur, Rajasthan 313001
India

HOME PAGE: http://www.iimu.ac.in

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
163
Abstract Views
899
Rank
329,348
PlumX Metrics