Supply Chain Contracts Under Uncertainty of Retailer Counterfeiting
10 Pages Posted: 13 Jan 2014 Last revised: 7 Aug 2014
Date Written: January 13, 2014
Abstract
We model a supply chain scenario in which the genuine manufacturer is uncertain whether a retailer sells counterfeits alongside authentic products. We evaluate the optimal strategies for players under wholesale price contracts and two-part tariff contracts and analyse the impact of the uncertainty of retailer counterfeiting on the manufacturer’s pricing and expected profits. Furthermore, we investigate whether the two-part tariff is more effective compared with the wholesale price contract.
Keywords: Counterfeiting, Information Asymmetry, Supply Chain Contracts
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Sundaresan, Naveen and Shah, Janat, Supply Chain Contracts Under Uncertainty of Retailer Counterfeiting (January 13, 2014). Indian Institute of Management Udaipur Research Paper Series No. 2012-2171274, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2378226 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378226
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