Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality
31 Pages Posted: 14 Jan 2014
Date Written: December 30, 2013
Abstract
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects’ costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the mechanism is conducive to efficiency, despite the multiplicity of equilibria and underbidding incentives. The only condition is that the cost of the most efficient project must be positive.
Keywords: public project, bidding behavior, procedural fairness
JEL Classification: C720, C920, D630, H440
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Güth, Werner and Kliemt, Hartmut and Koukoumelis, Anastasios and Levati, Maria Vittoria and Ploner, Matteo and Ploner, Matteo, Procedurally Fair Collective Provision: Its Requirements and Experimental Functionality (December 30, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4541, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2378306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378306
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