Incidence of Bank Levy and Bank Market Power

CEPII Working Paper No. 2013-21

27 Pages Posted: 15 Jan 2014

See all articles by Gunther Capelle-Blancard

Gunther Capelle-Blancard

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (CES); PSB Paris School of Business

Olena Havrylchyk

CEPII, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales, Paris; Université Paris Ouest - Nanterre, La Défense - EconomiX

Date Written: July 4, 2013

Abstract

This is the first analysis of the incidence of a bank tax that is imposed on banks’ balance sheets. Within the framework of an oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model, the pass-through of a bank tax levied on loans is stronger when elasticity of credit demand is low. To test this hypothesis, we investigate the incidence of the Hungarian bank tax that was introduced in 2010 on banks’ assets. This case is well suited for our analysis because the tax rate is much higher for large banks than for small banks, which allows relying on difference-in-difference methodology to disentangle the impact of the tax from any other shock that might have occurred simultaneously. In line with model predictions, our estimations show that the tax is shifted to customers with the smallest demand elasticity, such as households. In terms of economic policy implications, our results suggest that enhanced borrower mobility could reduce the ability of banks to shift taxes to customers.

Keywords: banks, bank levy, tax incidence, financial regulation, market power

JEL Classification: G21, H22, L13

Suggested Citation

Capelle-Blancard, Gunther and Havrylchyk, Olena, Incidence of Bank Levy and Bank Market Power (July 4, 2013). CEPII Working Paper No. 2013-21. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2378340 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378340

Gunther Capelle-Blancard (Contact Author)

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne (CES) ( email )

106-112 Boulevard de l'hopital
106-112 Boulevard de l'Hôpital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France

PSB Paris School of Business ( email )

59 rue Nationale
Paris, 75013
France

Olena Havrylchyk

CEPII, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales, Paris ( email )

113 rue de Grenelle
Paris, F-75007
France

Université Paris Ouest - Nanterre, La Défense - EconomiX ( email )

200 Avenue de la République
Nanterre cedex, Nanterre Cedex 92000
France

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