Patents, Antitrust, and the High Cost of Health Care

Thomas F. Cotter

University of Minnesota Law School

January 13, 2014

13-APR Antitrust Source 1 (Apr. 2014)
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-02

Americans pay much more for health care than do consumers in other countries, but whether the expense is worth it is, to say the least, debatable. This essay discusses the comparative role of patents, antitrust, and other bodies of law in contributing to the high cost of health care in the United States. I argue that, although patents play a part in raising health care costs, that effect is offset to some degree by substantial countervailing benefits. More troubling has been a two-decade-long failure of antitrust law to prevent anticompetitive hospital mergers and other welfare-reducing practices, though in recent years the courts and agencies have begun to correct some of the worst abuses. Arguably more significant than the failures of either of these two bodies of law, however, are the many ways in which hospitals, drug companies, and other health-related industries often have been able to capture Congress and other entities that supposedly regulate their behavior.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: Patents, Antitrust, Health Care, Hospital Mergers, Hatch-Waxman, Pharmaceuticals, Reverse Payments, Pay-for-Delay, Drug Prices, FDA

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Date posted: January 14, 2014 ; Last revised: May 6, 2014

Suggested Citation

Cotter, Thomas F., Patents, Antitrust, and the High Cost of Health Care (January 13, 2014). 13-APR Antitrust Source 1 (Apr. 2014); Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2378530

Contact Information

Thomas F. Cotter (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-7527 (Phone)

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