Parallel versus Sequential Update and the Evolution of Cooperation with the Assistance of Emotional Strategies

17 Pages Posted: 20 Jan 2014

See all articles by Simone Righi

Simone Righi

Department of Computer Science; University College London - Financial Computing and Analytics Group, Department of Computer Science

Károly Takács

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Centre for Social Sciences

Date Written: January 19, 2014

Abstract

Our study contributes to the debate on the evolution of cooperation in the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) played on networks. We construct a model in which individuals are connected with positive and negative ties. Some agents play sign-dependent strategies that use the sign of the relation as a shorthand for determining appropriate action toward the opponent. In the context of our model in which network topology, agent strategic types and relational signs coevolve, the presence of sign-dependent strategies catalyzes the evolution of cooperation. We highlight how the success of cooperation depends on a crucial aspect of implementation: whether we apply parallel or sequential strategy update. Parallel updating, with averaging of payoffs across interactions in the social neighborhood, supports cooperation in a much wider set of parameter values than sequential updating. Our results cast doubts about the realism and generalizability of models that claim to explain the evolution of cooperation but implicitly assume parallel updating.

Keywords: evolution of cooperation; signed graphs; network dynamics; negative ties; emotions; synchronous vs asynchronous update.

Suggested Citation

Righi, Simone and Takács, Károly, Parallel versus Sequential Update and the Evolution of Cooperation with the Assistance of Emotional Strategies (January 19, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2381458 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2381458

Simone Righi (Contact Author)

Department of Computer Science ( email )

66-72 Gower Street
London, London WC1E 6EA
Great Britain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/view/simone-righi/

University College London - Financial Computing and Analytics Group, Department of Computer Science ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

Károly Takács

Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Centre for Social Sciences ( email )

Országház u. 30
Budapest, H-1014
Hungary

HOME PAGE: http://web.uni-corvinus.hu/~tkaroly

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