28 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2014
Date Written: December 31, 2013
Right-holders can create differences between their cultural goods to attract consumers with varying levels of willingness to pay. Some Internet intermediaries propose similar choices but do so without authorization. In this paper, we present a theoretical model of copyright piracy in which a rightholder competes in price with an Internet intermediary in a leader-follower game. The Internet intermediary provides two types of streaming goods (with and without restrictions). Copyright and intellectual property rights on the Internet are subject to ex-post adjudication. This means that enforcement can lead to uncertainty regarding Internet intermediaries’ liability. We analyze how copyright enforcement and quality differences impact price competition. Our analysis suggests that law uncertainty plays a role in an intermediary’s decision to enter the market, and thus that quality has an impact on law enforcement efficiency.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lefort, Marine, Copyright Enforcement and Quality Differentiation on the Internet (December 31, 2013). Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2013, 10(2), 27-54. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2381877