Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Copyright Enforcement and Quality Differentiation on the Internet

28 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2014  

Marine Lefort

École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris - Centre d'Économie Industrielle (CERNA)

Date Written: December 31, 2013

Abstract

Right-holders can create differences between their cultural goods to attract consumers with varying levels of willingness to pay. Some Internet intermediaries propose similar choices but do so without authorization. In this paper, we present a theoretical model of copyright piracy in which a rightholder competes in price with an Internet intermediary in a leader-follower game. The Internet intermediary provides two types of streaming goods (with and without restrictions). Copyright and intellectual property rights on the Internet are subject to ex-post adjudication. This means that enforcement can lead to uncertainty regarding Internet intermediaries’ liability. We analyze how copyright enforcement and quality differences impact price competition. Our analysis suggests that law uncertainty plays a role in an intermediary’s decision to enter the market, and thus that quality has an impact on law enforcement efficiency.

Suggested Citation

Lefort, Marine, Copyright Enforcement and Quality Differentiation on the Internet (December 31, 2013). Review of Economic Research on Copyright Issues, 2013, 10(2), 27-54. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2381877

Marine Lefort (Contact Author)

École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris - Centre d'Économie Industrielle (CERNA) ( email )

60, boulevard Saint Michel
75272 Paris Cedex 06, 75272
France

Paper statistics

Downloads
147
Rank
167,470
Abstract Views
705