Full Surplus Extraction and within-period Ex Post Implementation in Dynamic Environments

Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

41 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2014 Last revised: 7 May 2018

Shunya Noda

Stanford University, Department of Economics, Students

Date Written: May 1, 2018

Abstract

We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and for implementability of the targeted allocation rule (weak detectability) in this one-shot problem. We decompose the general dynamic problem into one-shot problems, and obtain sufficient conditions for surplus extraction and implementation.

Keywords: dynamic mechanism design, within-period ex post implementation, revenue maximization, full surplus extraction

JEL Classification: C73, D47, D82, D86

Suggested Citation

Noda, Shunya, Full Surplus Extraction and within-period Ex Post Implementation in Dynamic Environments (May 1, 2018). Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2382416 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2382416

Shunya Noda (Contact Author)

Stanford University, Department of Economics, Students ( email )

Stanford, CA
United States

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