Material Amendments of Public Contracts During Their Terms: From Violations of Competition to Symptoms of Corruption

Europen Procurement & Public Private Partnership, Volume 8, Number 4, 2013

16 Pages Posted: 11 Mar 2021

See all articles by Gabriella M. Racca

Gabriella M. Racca

University of Turin - Department of Management

Roberto Cavallo Perin

University of Turin - School of Law

Date Written: December 1, 2013

Abstract

The problems of incorrect contract execution are widespread in any procurement system. Often the quality promised in the contract signed after the award procedure is not delivered during the execution phase and the procuring entities accept a different and worse-thanpromised performance. The infringement of the contract can lead to a material amendment related to a modification of the economic balance of the initial contract. Such situation can be due to the incompetence of the procuring officials or can be considered a symptom of lack of integrity. Adequate efforts in favour of competition, transparency and objective criteria in decision-making as fundamental principles and instruments to prevent corruption are necessary throughout the entire cycle of the public procurement process, from the beginning of the procedure to the conclusion of the performance phase. Otherwise, after the award, the procuring entity may accept a different and less costly performance in violation of free competition and equal treatment principle. The new Directive Proposal on Public procurement addresses such issues and for the first time regulates the execution phase, by identifying and thus limiting the amendments admitted.

Keywords: Public Procurement, EU Directive, material amendements, corruption, integrity

JEL Classification: H57, H83

Suggested Citation

Racca, Gabriella M. and Cavallo Perin, Roberto, Material Amendments of Public Contracts During Their Terms: From Violations of Competition to Symptoms of Corruption (December 1, 2013). Europen Procurement & Public Private Partnership, Volume 8, Number 4, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2382446

Gabriella M. Racca (Contact Author)

University of Turin - Department of Management ( email )

C.so Unione Sovietica, 218 bis
Turin, 10100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.management.unito.it/racca

Roberto Cavallo Perin

University of Turin - School of Law ( email )

Lungo Dora Siena, 100
Torino, Torino 10100
Italy

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