Does European Union Policy Making Explain Accounting Choices? An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Investigations by the Directorate General for Competition on Accounting Choices

Journal of Management & Governance 18 (3), 2014, p. 717–731.

Posted: 23 Jan 2014 Last revised: 11 Feb 2017

Date Written: January 22, 2014

Abstract

The hypothesis that political costs caused by the regulatory process impact upon accounting has been tested extensively and has found considerable empirical support. However, most studies use data from the United States. Whether the conclusions carry over to different institutional settings is an open question. This study exploits the fact that, in the European Union, there exists a policy area – competition policy – in which the European Commission can act in a manner significantly less constrained than in most other policy areas, imposing substantial fines on companies found to be in infringement of European competition regulations. Companies investigated by the Commission’s Directorate General for Competition have strong incentives to deflect attention and keep a low profile. It is conjectured that such companies will use income-decreasing accruals in order not to appear to be making unjustified profits. The results confirm this conjecture.

Keywords: political costs, earnings management, antitrust, competition policy

JEL Classification: M40, M41, M48

Suggested Citation

Koenigsgruber, Roland and Windisch, David, Does European Union Policy Making Explain Accounting Choices? An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Investigations by the Directorate General for Competition on Accounting Choices (January 22, 2014). Journal of Management & Governance 18 (3), 2014, p. 717–731., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383121

Roland Koenigsgruber (Contact Author)

SKEMA Business School ( email )

Lille
France

David Windisch

University of Amsterdam ( email )

Amsterdam Business School
Plantage Muidergracht 12
Amsterdam, 1018 TV
Netherlands

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
511
PlumX Metrics