The Virtue of Cassis De Dijon 25 Years Later – It Is Not Dead, It Just Smells Funny

Purnhagen/Rott (eds.), Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation, Dordrecht: Springer, 2014, Forthcoming 2014

Wageningen Working Papers in Law and Governance 2014/01

53 Pages Posted: 23 Jan 2014 Last revised: 21 Feb 2014

See all articles by Kai P. Purnhagen

Kai P. Purnhagen

Wageningen University; Erasmus University of Rotterdam - Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics

Date Written: January 22, 2014

Abstract

This piece specifies how and where the Cassis de Dijon case influenced EU internal market regulation. For a start, I will place the case into the more general context of internal market integration (1). I will then highlight the different concepts that have been developed from the Cassis de Dijon case such as e.g. the theory of the information paradigm, the confident consumer, the principle of mutual recognition, and the “new approach”. I will show how each of these concepts has developed in the course of internal market law (2). Finally, I will conclude that albeit that these principles have come under attack from various sources, the lessons drawn from Cassis de Dijon still remain the yardstick for the evaluation of internal market law today (3).

Keywords: Cassis de Dijon, internal market regulation, information paradigm, confident consumer

JEL Classification: K20, K32, K33

Suggested Citation

Purnhagen, Kai Peter, The Virtue of Cassis De Dijon 25 Years Later – It Is Not Dead, It Just Smells Funny (January 22, 2014). Purnhagen/Rott (eds.), Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation, Dordrecht: Springer, 2014, Forthcoming 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383202 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2383202

Kai Peter Purnhagen (Contact Author)

Wageningen University ( email )

Hollandseweg 1
Wageningen, 6706KN
Netherlands

Erasmus University of Rotterdam - Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics ( email )

Burgemeester Oudlaan 50
PO box 1738
Rotterdam, 3000 DR
Netherlands

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