Evidence-Free Policy: The Case of the National Injury Insurance Scheme

Agenda, Volume 20, Number 1, 2013 pp.55-69

15 Pages Posted: 24 Jan 2014

See all articles by Mark D. Harrison

Mark D. Harrison

SMART Facility, University of Wollongong

Date Written: July 7, 2013

Abstract

The Productivity Commission report ‘Disability Care and Support’ recommends tort liability be replaced by a compulsory, government-run, no-fault scheme. But theory and evidence indicate moving to a no-fault scheme will increase the accident rate. Even a move from non-risk-rated third-party insurance to non-risk-rated first-party insurance reduces incentives for care. A no-fault scheme is not superior to current policies; genuine reform will need to be informed by law and economics literature.

Keywords: law and economics; no fault insurance; tort law

JEL Classification: K13

Suggested Citation

Harrison, Mark D., Evidence-Free Policy: The Case of the National Injury Insurance Scheme (July 7, 2013). Agenda, Volume 20, Number 1, 2013 pp.55-69, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2383832

Mark D. Harrison (Contact Author)

SMART Facility, University of Wollongong ( email )

Northfields Avenue
Wollongong, New South Wales 2522
Australia

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