Three International Courts and Their Constitutional Problems
35 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2014 Last revised: 30 Sep 2014
Date Written: January 23, 2014
The United States’ potential participation in the International Criminal Court (ICC) raises serious constitutional questions that have never been subject to judicial examination. However, in two distinct historical episodes, separated by nearly 100 years, the U.S. considered proposals to join such international courts and found them wanting. In an earlier article, The Constitutionality of International Courts: The Forgotten Precedent of Slave-Trade Tribunals, I examined the first such episode, the early 19th century objections international commissions to try American vessels arrested for slave trading. In a reply article, Prof. Jenny Martinez took issue with my analysis, arguing that the constitutional objections raised by John Quincy Adams and others were motivated by ideological considerations. In this Article, I respond to those arguments, while also further developing the subject by examining the second relevant historical episode, the constitutional debate over the International Prize Court. Those discussions corroborate the constitutional objections raised in the slave courts episode, and suggest yet further constitutional problems with the ICC. This Article first shows how a full examination of the historical record shows that even those in Congress and the executive that did not share the ideological biases Martinez identifies did not dispute the constitutional objections put forth with the Administration. Moreover, constitutional interpretation by the political branches typically dovetails with political views, but this does not neutralize its significance. The International Prize Court was a product of the Hague Conference of 1907. The proposed Court would impartially apply the international law of maritime warfare. The Prize Court Treaty was hailed by leading statesmen as a historic development in international law and relations, that would usher in a new era where law, rather than power, ruled international affairs. Nonetheless, the Senate refused because the treaty would violate Art. III. Because the Prize Court could review for error decisions of the Supreme Court, it would undermine its “Supremacy.” Some scholars argued that Congress’s power to create non-Art. III courts justified the treaty, or in an argument reminiscent of Martinez’s, that the international law subject matter satisfied constitutional concerns. These defenses fell flat. The Senate and the Executive generally recognized the strength of the constitutional objections. These principles have direct implications for the ICC. While the ICC’s standard of review is extremely deferential, it ultimately can under certain circumstances examine national court decisions for error. This would be unconstitutional based on the Prize Court precedent.
Keywords: international courts, criminal law, Art. III, separation of powers
JEL Classification: K10, K19, K30, K33
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation