Marry Your Like: Assortative Mating and Income Inequality

26 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2014  

Jeremy Greenwood

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Nezih Guner

ICREA-MOVE; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Georgi Kocharkov

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics

Cezar Santos

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2014

Abstract

Has there been an increase in positive assortative mating? Does assortative mating contribute to household income inequality? Data from the United States Census Bureau suggests there has been a rise in assortative mating. Additionally, assortative mating affects household income inequality. In particular, if matching in 2005 between husbands and wives had been random, instead of the pattern observed in the data, then the Gini coefficient would have fallen from the observed 0.43 to 0.34, so that income inequality would be smaller. Thus, assortative mating is important for income inequality. The high level of married female labor-force participation in 2005 is important for this result.

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Suggested Citation

Greenwood, Jeremy and Guner, Nezih and Kocharkov, Georgi and Santos, Cezar, Marry Your Like: Assortative Mating and Income Inequality (January 2014). NBER Working Paper No. w19829. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2384288

Jeremy Greenwood (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://jeremygreenwood.net

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Nezih Guner

ICREA-MOVE ( email )

Campus de Bellaterra-UAB Edifici B (s/n)
EDIFICI B
Cerdanyola del Vallès
, Barcelona 08193
Spain

Autonomous University of Barcelona ( email )

Plaça Cívica
Cerdañola del Valles
Barcelona, Barcelona 08193
Spain

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Georgi Kocharkov

University of Konstanz - Department of Economics ( email )

Konstanz, D-78457
Germany

Cezar Santos

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças ( email )

Praia de Botafogo 190/1125, CEP
Rio de Janeiro RJ 22253-900
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/czrsantos

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