Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy

Jurisprudence, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014, pp. 41-55

Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 169/2014

18 Pages Posted: 25 Jan 2014 Last revised: 10 Apr 2016

See all articles by Roger Cotterrell

Roger Cotterrell

Queen Mary University of London, School of Law

Date Written: January 24, 2014

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to describe and defend jurisprudence as an enterprise of theorising about law that is distinct from what is now understood as legal philosophy in the Anglophone world. Jurisprudence must draw on legal philosophy but also from many other resources. It should be an open quest for juristically (rather than philosophically) significant insights about law. Its purpose is to inform and guide the juristic task of making organised social regulation a valuable practice, rooted and effective in the specific contexts and historical conditions in which it exists but also aimed at serving demands for justice and security through regulation, as these perennial values are understood in their time and place, and as they might be further clarified and reconciled as legal ideals.

Keywords: Jurisprudence; legal philosophy; contemporary legal positivism; universalism; legal naturalism; law in context; socio-legal perspectives; bricolage; jurists

Suggested Citation

Cotterrell, Roger, Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy (January 24, 2014). Jurisprudence, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2014, pp. 41-55; Queen Mary School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 169/2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2384615

Roger Cotterrell (Contact Author)

Queen Mary University of London, School of Law ( email )

Mile End Road
London, E1 4NS
United Kingdom
+44 (0)207 882 3936 (Phone)
+44(0)208 981 8733 (Fax)

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