The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models

2 Pages Posted: 7 Feb 2014 Last revised: 27 Jul 2017

See all articles by Kai Lessmann

Kai Lessmann

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)

Ulrike Kornek

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)

Valentina Bosetti

Bocconi University; CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change

Rob Dellink

Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group; Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences

Johannes Emmerling

CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici - European Institute onEconomy and the Environment (EIEE)

Johan Eyckmans

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies

Miyuki Nagashima

Wageningen University

Zili Yang

State University of New York at Binghamton

Date Written: January 24, 2014

Abstract

In this paper we report results from a comparison of numerically calibrated game theoretic integrated assessment models that explore stability and performance of international coalitions for climate change mitigation. Specifically, by means of this ensemble of models we are able to identify robust results concerning incentives of nations to commit themselves to a climate agreement, and to estimate what stable agreements can achieve in terms of greenhouse gas mitigation. We also assess the potential of transfers that redistribute the surplus of cooperation in order to foster stability of climate coalitions. In contrast to much of the existing analytical game theoretical literature, we find substantial scope for self-enforcing climate coalitions in most models that close much of the abatement and welfare gap between complete absence of cooperation and full cooperation. This more positive message follows from the use of transfer schemes that are designed to counteract free riding incentives.

Keywords: Coalition Stability, International Environmental Agreements, Numerical modeling, Transfers

JEL Classification: Q5, Q58, C7

Suggested Citation

Lessmann, Kai and Kornek, Ulrike and Bosetti, Valentina and Dellink, Rob and Weikard, Hans-Peter and Emmerling, Johannes and Eyckmans, Johan and Nagashima, Miyuki and Yang, Zili, The Stability and Effectiveness of Climate Coalitions: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Integrated Assessment Models (January 24, 2014). FEEM Working Paper 5.2014; CMCC Research Paper No. RP0229. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2384623 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2384623

Kai Lessmann (Contact Author)

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) ( email )

P.O. Box 601203
14412 Potsdam, Brandenburg
Germany

Ulrike Kornek

Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK) ( email )

Telegrafenberg 31
Potsdam, Brandenburg 14473
Germany

Valentina Bosetti

Bocconi University

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

CMCC - Euro Mediterranean Centre for Climate Change

via Augusto Imperatore, 16
Lecce, I-73100
Italy

Rob Dellink

Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group ( email )

P.O. Box 8130
Wageningen, 6700 EW
Netherlands
+31 (0)317 4 82009 (Phone)
+31 (0)317 4 84933 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.sls.wau.nl/enr/staff/dellink/

Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) ( email )

Paris
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/econ

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences ( email )

De Leeuwenborch
Hollandseweg 1
6706 KN Wageningen
Netherlands
+31 317 48 24 94 (Phone)
+31 317 48 49 33 (Fax)

Johannes Emmerling

CMCC - Centro Euro-Mediterraneo sui Cambiamenti Climatici - European Institute onEconomy and the Environment (EIEE) ( email )

Via Bergognone, 34
Milan
Italy

Johan Eyckmans

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Miyuki Nagashima

Wageningen University ( email )

Hollandseweg 1
6700 HB Wageningen, 6706KN
Netherlands

Zili Yang

State University of New York at Binghamton ( email )

Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States
607-777-4726 (Phone)

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