The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control and Dividend Policy

37 Pages Posted: 27 Jan 2014 Last revised: 12 Oct 2015

See all articles by Najah Attig

Najah Attig

Saint Mary's University - Department of Finance & Management Science

Narjess Boubakri

American University of Sharjah - School of Business and Management; HEC Montreal - Department of Finance

Sadok El Ghoul

University of Alberta - Campus Saint-Jean

Omrane Guedhami

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business

Date Written: August 30, 2015

Abstract

Using newly collected data on the ultimate ownership structure of publicly traded firms in nine East Asian economies, we find that family control is negatively related to the dividend payout ratio. Family firms are less (more) likely to increase (omit) dividends than non-family firms. These negative associations between family firms and dividend policy are more pronounced during the recent global financial crisis, suggesting that controlling families have incentives to expropriate more firm resources during crises than in normal times.

Keywords: Family control, Agency costs, Dividend policy, East Asia, Financial crisis

JEL Classification: G32, G35

Suggested Citation

Attig, Najah and Boubakri, Narjess and El Ghoul, Sadok and Guedhami, Omrane, The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control and Dividend Policy (August 30, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2385037 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2385037

Najah Attig

Saint Mary's University - Department of Finance & Management Science ( email )

Halifax, Nova Scotia B3H 3C3
Canada
902-491-8679 (Phone)

Narjess Boubakri

American University of Sharjah - School of Business and Management ( email )

P.O. Box 26666
Sharjah
United Arab Emirates

HOME PAGE: http://www.aus.edu

HEC Montreal - Department of Finance ( email )

3000 Chemin de la Cote-Sainte-Catherine
Montreal, Quebec H3T 2A7
Canada

Sadok El Ghoul (Contact Author)

University of Alberta - Campus Saint-Jean ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R3
Canada
780-465-8725 (Phone)
780-465-8760 (Fax)

Omrane Guedhami

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business ( email )

Columbia, SC
United States

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