The Bargaining Family Revisited

Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, Issue 2, May 2000

Posted: 19 Jun 2001

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Kjell Erik Lommerud

University of Bergen - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

We suggest a family bargaining model where human capital investment decisions are made non-cooperatively in a first stage, while day-to-day allocation of time is determined later through Nash bargaining, but with non-cooperative behaviour as the fall-back. One finding is that overinvestment in education may be even more of a problem in such a semi-cooperative model than in a fully non-cooperative one. Even though both the semi-cooperative model and the fully non-cooperative model predict overinvestment in education, policy conclusions that follow from the two models are distinctly different.

JEL Classification: D13, J24

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A. and Lommerud, Kjell Erik, The Bargaining Family Revisited. Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, Issue 2, May 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=238570

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( email )

Marstallplatz 1
Munich, 80539
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tax.mpg.de/en/pub/home.cfm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

90-98 Goswell Road
London, EC1V 7RR
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, 53072
Germany

Kjell Erik Lommerud

University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )

Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen, 5007
Norway
+47 5 558 9209 (Phone)
+47 5 558 9210 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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