Wage-Setting Institutions and Corporate Governance

Matthew Dimick

SUNY Buffalo Law School

Neel Rao

University at Buffalo, Department of Economics

January 24, 2014

Journal of Comparative Economics, Forthcoming
SUNY Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-017

Why do corporate governance law and practice differ across countries? This paper explains how wage-setting institutions influence ownership structures and investor protection laws. In particular, we identify a nonmonotonic relationship between the level of centralization in wage-bargaining institutions and the level of ownership concentration and investor protection laws. As wage setting becomes more centralized, ownership concentration within firms at first becomes more, and then less, concentrated. In addition, the socially optimal level of investor protection laws is decreasing in ownership concentration. Thus, as wage-setting institutions become more centralized, investor protection laws become less and then more protective. This explanation is consistent with the observable pattern of wage-setting structures, ownership concentration, and investor protection legislation across developed countries. While agreeing with recent research that highlights labor as an important corporate stakeholder in shaping corporate governance, a focus on bargaining structures can resolve an important puzzle this research confronts, namely, why Scandinavian countries with higher than average labor strength also have higher than average investor protection legislation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: Corporate governance, bargaining centralization, wage-setting structures, legal origin, labor, politics

JEL Classification: G34, K22, K42

Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: January 28, 2014 ; Last revised: February 8, 2016

Suggested Citation

Dimick, Matthew and Rao, Neel, Wage-Setting Institutions and Corporate Governance (January 24, 2014). Journal of Comparative Economics, Forthcoming; SUNY Buffalo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-017. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2386289 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2386289

Contact Information

Matthew Dimick (Contact Author)
SUNY Buffalo Law School ( email )
618 John Lord O'Brian Hall
Buffalo, NY 14260-1100
United States
716-645-7968 (Phone)

Neel Rao
University at Buffalo, Department of Economics ( email )
12 Capen Hall
Buffalo, NY 14260
United States
716-645-8674 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.buffalo.edu/~neelrao
Feedback to SSRN

Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 833
Downloads: 94
Download Rank: 221,081