Differentiated Economic Governance and the Reshaping of Dominium-Law

Forthcoming in M. Adams, F. Fabbrini and P. Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014)

University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 7/2014

31 Pages Posted: 30 Jan 2014

Date Written: January 13, 2014

Abstract

The European Union’s response to the economic crisis illustrates and dramatizes the increasing differentiation and pluralisation in the modes and techniques through which the EU now governs. Early characterizations of that response in terms of the return or revival of the ‘Community Method’ and of rules-based governance fail to grasp the range and diversity of responses as well as their ‘hybrid’ interactions. This diversity in governance is also reflected in the nature of the legal instruments through which the EU has sought to expand its governance capacity. In turn, the plural legal landscape creates variation in the domestic legal response. Adopting Daintith’s notion of dominium-law, it is argued that the EU’s response to the crisis is reshaping dominium-law not just at the domestic level but also in its reconfiguration within European public law itself.

Keywords: Europe, Crisis, Budgets, Economic governance, Constitutional law

JEL Classification: K2, K20, K29

Suggested Citation

Armstrong, Kenneth, Differentiated Economic Governance and the Reshaping of Dominium-Law (January 13, 2014). Forthcoming in M. Adams, F. Fabbrini and P. Larouche (eds), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014), University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 7/2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2387447 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2387447

Kenneth Armstrong (Contact Author)

Centre for European Legal Studies ( email )

10 West Road
Cambridge, CB3 9DZ
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/

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