Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers Be Published?
32 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2000
Date Written: August 2006
We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central-bank council members is socially beneficial when the public is unsure about the efficiency of central bankers and central bankers are angling for re-appointment. We show that publication is initially harmful since it creates a conflict between socially desirable and individually optimal behavior for somewhat less efficient central bankers. However, after re-appointment, losses will be lower when voting records are published since the government can distinguish highly efficient from less efficient central bankers more easily and can make central bankers individually accountable. In our model, the negative effects of voting transparency dominate, and expected overall losses are always larger when voting records are published.
Keywords: central banks, transparency, voting
JEL Classification: E58, D70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation