Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers Be Published?

32 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2000

See all articles by Hans Gersbach

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Volker Hahn

University of Konstanz

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2006

Abstract

We examine whether the publication of the individual voting records of central-bank council members is socially beneficial when the public is unsure about the efficiency of central bankers and central bankers are angling for re-appointment. We show that publication is initially harmful since it creates a conflict between socially desirable and individually optimal behavior for somewhat less efficient central bankers. However, after re-appointment, losses will be lower when voting records are published since the government can distinguish highly efficient from less efficient central bankers more easily and can make central bankers individually accountable. In our model, the negative effects of voting transparency dominate, and expected overall losses are always larger when voting records are published.

Keywords: central banks, transparency, voting

JEL Classification: E58, D70

Suggested Citation

Gersbach, Hans and Hahn, Volker, Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers Be Published? (August 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=238949 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.238949

Hans Gersbach

ETH Zurich - CER-ETH -Center of Economic Reseaarch ( email )

Zürichbergstrasse 18
Zurich, 8092
Switzerland
+41 44 632 82 80 (Phone)
+41 44 632 18 30 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Volker Hahn (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz ( email )

Box 143
Konstanz, 78457
Germany

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