Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389730
 


 



Offsetting Disagreement and Security Prices


Byoung-Hyoun Hwang


Cornell University - Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management; Korea University - Department of Finance

Dong Lou


London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Chengxi (Adam) Yin


Purdue University - Krannert School of Management

May 31, 2016


Abstract:     
We propose that the whole is generally valued at less than the sum of its parts. The reason is that, in the presence of short-sale constraints and investor disagreement, shares of a company are held by the most bullish investors. To the extent that being bullish on one company does not imply that the same investor is bullish on all other companies, the level of excitement about a portfolio of companies, naturally, is less than the sum of the level of excitement that the individual companies receive from their most fervent supporters. This lowers the value of the portfolio relative to the sum of the values of the individual components. Utilizing mergers and acquisitions, as well as closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, and conglomerates as settings where the value of the aggregate portfolio and the values of the underlying components can be separately evaluated, we present evidence supporting our proposition.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Disagreement, Belief Crossing, Short-Sale Constraints

JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14, G20


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Date posted: February 3, 2014 ; Last revised: June 1, 2016

Suggested Citation

Hwang, Byoung-Hyoun and Lou, Dong and Yin, Chengxi (Adam), Offsetting Disagreement and Security Prices (May 31, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2389730 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2389730

Contact Information

Byoung-Hyoun Hwang (Contact Author)
Cornell University - Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management ( email )
Ithaca, NY
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.bhwang.com
Korea University - Department of Finance
Seoul, 136-701
Korea
Dong Lou
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )
Department of Finance
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 (0)207 1075360 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/loud/
Chengxi Yin
Purdue University - Krannert School of Management ( email )
1310 Krannert Building
West Lafayette, IN 47907-1310
United States
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