Solving the Kidney Shortage via the Creation of Kidney Donation Co-operatives

20 Pages Posted: 4 Feb 2014 Last revised: 23 Dec 2016

See all articles by K. C. Eames

K. C. Eames

California Polytechnic State University

Patrick Holder

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics

Eduardo Zambrano

California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo - Economics

Date Written: December 22, 2016

Abstract

Many people object to the creation of a market for kidneys on the grounds that such reform would hurt those patients unable to afford the market price of a kidney and that donors do not understand the risks they’re taking when donating. In this paper, we propose a mechanism, the kidney co-operative, designed to provide sufficient incentives to alleviate the kidney shortage while at the same time addressing the concerns regarding the potential losers from reform. We show that it is reasonable to expect that the number of transplants will be larger under the kidney co-operative mechanism than under either the status quo or a conventional market mechanism.

The online appendix for this paper is available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2390352.

Keywords: Organ Donation, Organ Trade

JEL Classification: D02, I10

Suggested Citation

Eames, K. C. and Holder, Patrick and Zambrano, Eduardo, Solving the Kidney Shortage via the Creation of Kidney Donation Co-operatives (December 22, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2390356 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2390356

K. C. Eames

California Polytechnic State University ( email )

San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
United States

Patrick Holder

University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB) - Department of Economics ( email )

2127 North Hall
Santa Barbara, CA 93106
United States

Eduardo Zambrano (Contact Author)

California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo - Economics ( email )

Orfalea College of Business
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
United States
805-756-5327 (Phone)
805-756-1473 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://calpoly.edu/~ezambran

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