Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review

35 Pages Posted: 8 Feb 2014 Last revised: 11 Mar 2014

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Jud Mathews

Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law

Date Written: February 4, 2014

Abstract

This paper offers a theory to explain cross-national variation in administrative law doctrines and practices. Administrative law regimes vary along three primary dimensions: the scope of delegation to agencies, agencies’ exercise of discretion, and judicial practices of deference to agencies. Working with a principal-agent framework, we show how cross-national differences in institutions’ capacities and the environments they face encourage the adoption of divergent strategies that lead to a variety of distinct, stable, equilibrium outcomes. We apply our model to explain patterns of administrative law in the United States, Germany, France, and Commonwealth jurisdictions.

Keywords: administrative law, principal-agent framework, U.S., Germany, France

JEL Classification: D73, D78, K23

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Mathews, Judkins, Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference: Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review (February 4, 2014). American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 62, No. 1, 2014; Penn State Law Research Paper No. 6-2014; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS14-26; Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 14-27. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2390723

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Judkins Mathews (Contact Author)

Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law ( email )

Lewis Katz Building
University Park, PA 16802
United States

HOME PAGE: https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/faculty/mathews

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