Coordination with Independent Private Values: Why Pedestrians Sometimes Bump into Each Other

17 Pages Posted: 6 Feb 2014

See all articles by Christoph Kuzmics

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 3, 2014

Abstract

Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games, however, also have other (pure strategy) equilibria with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination. Perhaps surprisingly, in some such games, these Pareto-inefficient equilibria, with a positive likelihood of mis-coordination, are the only evolutionarily stable equilibria of the game.

Keywords: incomplete information, continuously stable strategy, CSS, evolutionary stability, best-response dynamics

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D82

Suggested Citation

Kuzmics, Christoph, Coordination with Independent Private Values: Why Pedestrians Sometimes Bump into Each Other (February 3, 2014). Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 501. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2391198 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2391198

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

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