The Hybrid Open Access Citation Advantage: How Many More Cites is a $3,000 Fee Buying You?

Published as How Many More Cites is a $3,000 Open Access Fee Buying You? Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment, in: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 56, Issue 2, 2018, pp. 931-954

Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-02

27 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2014 Last revised: 30 Apr 2018

Frank Mueller-Langer

European Commission, Joint Research Center; Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition

Richard Watt

University of Canterbury - Economics and Finance; The Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 31, 2014

Abstract

We study the hybrid open access (HOA) citation effect. Under HOA pilot agreements, HOA is assigned for all articles of eligible authors. We use unique data on 208 (1,121) HOA (closed access) economics articles. We control for the quality of journals, articles and institutions and citations to RePec pre-prints. Performing Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood regressions, HOA turns out to be a significant predictor of citations with marginal effects ranging between 22% and 26%. However, once we additionally control for institution quality and citations to RePec pre-prints, the marginal HOA citation advantage turns out to be insignificant and drops to 0.4%.

Keywords: Copyright, Open Access, Academic Publishing, Hybrid Open Access, diffusion processes, citation effects

Suggested Citation

Mueller-Langer, Frank and Watt, Richard, The Hybrid Open Access Citation Advantage: How Many More Cites is a $3,000 Fee Buying You? (January 31, 2014). Published as How Many More Cites is a $3,000 Open Access Fee Buying You? Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment, in: Economic Inquiry, Vol. 56, Issue 2, 2018, pp. 931-954; Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 14-02. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2391692 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2391692

Frank Mueller-Langer (Contact Author)

European Commission, Joint Research Center

Seville
Spain

Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition ( email )

Munich
Germany

Richard Watt

University of Canterbury - Economics and Finance ( email )

Private Bag 4800
Christchurch
New Zealand

The Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI) ( email )

Apartado de correos 1100
Palma de Mallorca, 08080
Spain

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