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Asymmetric Auctions

Posted: 26 Jul 2001  

Eric Maskin

Princeton University - Department of Economics; Harvard University - Department of Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

John G. Riley

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

The revenue-equivalence theorm for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer with the highest reservation price wins and any buyer with the lowest possible reservation price has zero expected surplus. Thus, in particular, the two most common auction institutions-the open 'English' and the sealed high-bid auction-are equivalent despite their rather different strategic properties.

Suggested Citation

Maskin, Eric and Riley, John G., Asymmetric Auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, Iss. 3, July 2000 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=239258

Eric S. Maskin (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
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(617) 495-4167 (Phone)
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

50 Memorial Drive
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United States

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Institute for Advanced Study
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Princeton, NJ 08540
United States
(609) 734-8309 (Phone)
(609) 951-4457 (Fax)

John G. Riley

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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