Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions

Posted: 26 Jul 2001

See all articles by Eric Maskin

Eric Maskin

Princeton University - Department of Economics; Harvard University - Department of Economics; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

John G. Riley

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Abstract

There is a voluminous theoretical literature on sealed high-bid auctions (auctions in which bids are sealed and the high bidder pays his bid). See for example, Vickery (1961), Myerson (1981), riley and Samuelson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982), Mathews (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), Holt(1980) Cox, Smith and Walker (1988). A critical property on which this literature relies is the existence of equilibrium in which buyers? bidding strategies are monotonic in their types. This enables the analyst to perform comparative statics as the distribution of types changes, and to compare the welfare properties of the high-bid auction with those of other auction institutions.

Suggested Citation

Maskin, Eric S. and Riley, John G., Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions. The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67, Iss. 3, July 2000 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=239291

Eric S. Maskin (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

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John G. Riley

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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