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Antitrust Intent

96 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2000  

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Ronald A. Cass

Center for the Rule of Law; Cass & Associates, PC; Boston University School of Law; Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason School of Law

Abstract

Many legal rules turn on a party's state of mind or intent with respect to some action or consequence. Legal scholars have long debated the contours of such requirements and the sorts of proof required for them. Intent has been an especially controversial issue in antitrust law. This paper provides a theory of legal standards that explains the role of intent analysis in antitrust and in other areas of the law. We argue that intent requirements, and many other legal rules, can be understood by focusing on the goal of minimizing the expected costs from legal errors. After developing a positive theory of intent standards, we apply the theory to antitrust to show that it explains both the allocation of and proof requirements for the specific intent standards in antitrust doctrine. We then use the Microsoft case as a concrete study of the function of intent rules in antitrust.


JEL Classification: K21, L4, L41

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N. and Cass, Ronald A., Antitrust Intent. Southern California Law Review, Vol. 74. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=239324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.239324

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

Ronald A. Cass

Center for the Rule of Law ( email )

9907 Georgetown Pike
Suite 148
Great Falls, VA 22066
United States
703-438-8832 (Phone)

Cass & Associates, PC ( email )

10560 Fox Forest Drive
Great Falls, VA 22066
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703-438-7590 (Phone)
703-438-7591 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cassassociates.net

Boston University School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States

Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason School of Law

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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