Consistent Collective Decisions Under Majorities Based on Differences

34 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2014

See all articles by Mostapha Diss

Mostapha Diss

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi

University of Valladolid - Grupo de investigaci

Date Written: January 1, 2014

Abstract

The main criticism to the aggregation of individual preferences under majority rules refers to the possibility of reaching inconsistent collective decisions from the election process. In these cases, the collective preference includes cycles and even could prevent the election of any alternative as the collective choice. The likelihood of consistent outcomes under two classes of majority rules constitutes the aim of this paper. Specifically, we focus on majority rules that require certain consensus in individual preferences to declare an alternative as the winner. In the case of majorities based on difference of votes, such requirement asks to the winner alternative to obtain a difference in votes with respect to the loser alternative taken into account that individuals are endowed with weak preference orderings. Same requirement is asked to the restriction of these rules to individual linear preferences, whereas in the case of majorities based on difference in support, the requirement has to do with the difference in the sum of the intensities for the alternatives in contest.

Keywords: Majorities based on di erence of votes; Majorities based on diff erence in support; Probability; Transitivity; Triple-acyclicity

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Diss, Mostapha and Pérez-Asurmendi, Patrizia, Consistent Collective Decisions Under Majorities Based on Differences (January 1, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2393903 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2393903

Mostapha Diss (Contact Author)

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Patrizia Pérez-Asurmendi

University of Valladolid - Grupo de investigaci ( email )

Avda. Valle de Esgueva 6
Valladolid, 47011
Spain

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
9
Abstract Views
223
PlumX Metrics