Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance

39 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2014

See all articles by Braz Camargo

Braz Camargo

University of Western Ontario - Department of Economics

Rafael Camelo

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics

Sergio Firpo

Insper

Vladimir P. Ponczek

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics

Abstract

This paper uses a discontinuity on the test score disclosure rules of the National Secondary Education Examination in Brazil to test whether test score disclosure affects student performance, the composition of students in schools, and school observable inputs. We find that test score disclosure has a heterogeneous impact on test scores, but only increases average test scores in private schools. Since test score disclosure has no impact on student composition and school observable inputs in both public and private schools, our results suggest that test score disclosure changes the behavior of teachers and school managers in private schools by affecting the market incentives faced by such schools. We also develop a model of school and student behavior to help explain our empirical findings.

Keywords: test score disclosure, market incentives, public and private schools

JEL Classification: I20, I21

Suggested Citation

Camargo, Braz and Camelo, Rafael and Firpo, Sergio and Ponczek, Vladimir P., Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7941, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2396436 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2396436

Braz Camargo (Contact Author)

University of Western Ontario - Department of Economics ( email )

London, Ontario N6A 5B8
Canada

Rafael Camelo

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics

No Address Available

Sergio Firpo

Insper ( email )

R Quata 300
Sao Paulo, 04542-030
Brazil

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/sergiopfirpo/

Vladimir P. Ponczek

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - Sao Paulo School of Economics ( email )

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