31 Pages Posted: 16 Feb 2014 Last revised: 14 Mar 2014
Date Written: February 15, 2014
The Constitution’s distribution of power among three branches of the federal government is valued because it aims to produce some bundle of valuable social or public goods such as democracy, rights, or welfare. This essay examines the interaction between constitutional structure and those goods a libertarian might pursue. Analyzing the options for both a constitutional designer and a constitutional interpreter, it suggests that first-order preferences over liberty fail to translate into structural design maxims in any mechanical or predictable way.
Keywords: Separation of powers; libertarian theory
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Huq, Aziz Z., Libertarian Separation of Powers (February 15, 2014). NYU Journal of Law & Liberty, Forthcoming; U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 464 . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2396581 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2396581