Developing Two‐Tiered Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law: Assessing the Impact of the Societas Privata Europaea

20 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2014

See all articles by Martina Eckardt

Martina Eckardt

Andrássy University Budapest

Wolfgang Kerber

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics

Date Written: March 2014

Abstract

Since the Centros ruling in 1999, Europe has evolved a two‐tiered system of corporate laws. This opens up the possibility of some horizontal regulatory competition between the corporate laws of the member states. Following a draft regulation on the European Private Company (SPE), an additional legal form tailored to the needs of small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs) is being proposed. We analyse whether such a supranational European legal form can be recommended from the perspective of the economic theory of legal federalism. We present a general theoretical framework for studying centralization/harmonization versus the decentralization of legal rules and regulations in regard to corporate law in the EU. Our analysis of the empirical evidence on horizontal regulatory competition and the advantages or disadvantages of such an additional legal form for SMEs shows clearly that it might render many benefits, compared with the existing situation of only (partial) horizontal competition.

Suggested Citation

Eckardt, Martina and Kerber, Wolfgang, Developing Two‐Tiered Regulatory Competition in EU Corporate Law: Assessing the Impact of the Societas Privata Europaea (March 2014). Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 41, Issue 1, pp. 152-171, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2398142 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2014.00660.x

Martina Eckardt (Contact Author)

Andrássy University Budapest ( email )

Pollack Mihály tér 3
Budapest, 1088
Hungary
+36 1 266 4408 (Phone)
+36 1 266 3099 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.andrassyuni.hu/

Wolfgang Kerber

University of Marburg - School of Business & Economics ( email )

Am Plan 2
Marburg, D-35037
Germany
+49 6421 2823921 (Phone)

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