The Fundamental Privatization Theorem: Ideology, Evolution, Practice

30 Pages Posted: 22 Feb 2014

See all articles by Alexander Radygin

Alexander Radygin

Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy; Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) - Institute of Applied Economic Research

Revold Entov

Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy

Date Written: February 20, 2014

Abstract

The article focuses on the analysis of the evolution of contemporary theoretic approaches to the choice of an optimal form of ownership, and the corresponding estimation of privatization in the context of the advantages and disadvantages of the public and private sectors of the national economy. Various interpretations of the fundamental privatization theorem are considered: based on the principal-agent relationship; based on the comparison of the structure of information flows; the combination of ownership rights and contractual rights; consideration of sociopolitical factors, etc. The latest trends in Russia’s de-statization policy in 2010-2013 are analyzed in the context of ‘reluctant privatization’, with special emphasis on the asymmetry between the statization and privatization processes.

Keywords: privatization, government failures, state policy, public choice, allocational efficiency, information

JEL Classification: H82, K11, L32, L33

Suggested Citation

Radygin, Alexander and Entov, Revold, The Fundamental Privatization Theorem: Ideology, Evolution, Practice (February 20, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2398960 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2398960

Alexander Radygin (Contact Author)

Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy ( email )

Gazetny pereulok, 3-5
Moscow, 125993
Russia

Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA) - Institute of Applied Economic Research ( email )

Russia

Revold Entov

Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy ( email )

Gazetny pereulok, 3-5
Moscow, 125993
Russia

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