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Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses: Online Appendix

Posted: 24 Feb 2014 Last revised: 10 Mar 2017

Kirill Chernomaz

San Francisco State University - Department of Economics

Hisayuki Yoshimoto

University of Glasgow - Adam Smith Business School

Date Written: December 3, 2014

Abstract

This online appendix contains the plots and supplemental descriptions for "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses."

The paper "Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses" to which this Supplement applies is available at the following URL: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2394832

Keywords: Empirical Auctions, Asymmetric Auctions, Structural Estimations, Nonparametric Identifications, Risk Aversion

JEL Classification: C13, D44

Suggested Citation

Chernomaz, Kirill and Yoshimoto, Hisayuki, Are Estimates of Asymmetric First-Price Auctions Credible? Semi- & Nonparametric Analyses: Online Appendix (December 3, 2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2400104 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2400104

Kirill Chernomaz

San Francisco State University - Department of Economics ( email )

1600 Holloway Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94132
United States
(415) 405-2699 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://online.sfsu.edu/~kirillch/

Hisayuki Yoshimoto (Contact Author)

University of Glasgow - Adam Smith Business School ( email )

Glasgow
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://hisayukiyoshimoto.org/

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