How Public Spending is Fuelling Electoral Strategies in Romania

Abstract

Following a process of interpenetration between parties and state, public funds are increasingly being used to further the organizational and electoral objectives of political parties. While the available literature has been mainly concerned with the regulated channels of party funding, much less attention has been paid to the informal channels of funding party activity from public funds. This paper develops this latter aspect, and looks at evidence collected from Romania, linking the ruling parties spending patterns to their political strategies. It analyses both the distributive politics of ruling parties and the informal dimension of political allocations of public resources. It is this paper’s assertion that public funds are distributed through clientelistic channels, in an attempt to influence electoral results in Romania. This creates disproportionate advantages for the ruling parties, with a high potential of affecting negatively the nature of the democratic process.

Keywords: clientelistic exchanges, public funds, political parties, Romania

JEL Classification: H41, H50